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By Saurabh Bhattacharjee

The announcement of the flagship National Health Protection Scheme [NHPS] by the Finance Minister. Mr Arun Jaitley in his budget speech earlier this week has led to renewed attention on the direction of public healthcare in India. Branded by some as the ‘Modicare’, the scheme promises to provide an insurance cover uptoRs. 5 lakh per family per year for treatment in secondary and tertiary care institutions to around 10 crore poor and vulnerable families. Given that public expenditure on health care in India has traditionally hovered around a paltry 1% of India’s GDP,[1] the announcement of NHPS may signal a new phase of increased public investment in healthcare. Yet, NHPS is not India’s first brush with public health insurance.

The Ministry of Labour launched the RashtriyaSwasthyaBima Yojana (RSBY) in 2008 for Below Poverty Line (BPL) families.[2] In addition, several state-level schemes like the Vajpayee Arogyasri in Karnataka,[3] Rajiv Arogyasri in Andhra Pradesh[4] and Megha Scheme in Meghalaya[5] were started in the last decade. While the Megha scheme is a universal scheme, the RSBY provides an annual insurance cover of Rs. 30,000 for BPL families. NHPS promises to take this tradition of state-funded cashless health insurance scheme for targeted households a notch ahead and scale it up in an unprecedented manner. There has been considerable attention on the fiscal implications of this scheme and how inadequate budgetary outlay undermine the credibility of the scheme.[6] But what does the scheme portend for effective realisation of the human right to health? In so far as right to health constitutes an inalienable human right, there is a fair case to evaluate the proposed scheme against the touchstone of the obligations of the state to further the realisation of the right.

The human right to health has been enshrined in numerous international legal instruments, most notably Article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[7] and Article 12.1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,[8] as an inalienable right that inheres in every human being. General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) provide us a very comprehensive framework on the normative content of the right.[9] It clarifies that the essential elements of the right to health include availability, accessibility, affordability, acceptability and quality. Examining the contours of the proposed NHPS scheme, as sketchy as they are at this moment, through the lens of these elements of right to health suggests that the scheme may not enhance effective and meaningful access to healthcare. While insufficient financial support may indeed impede the effectiveness of the scheme, it is posited that the core edifice of the NHPS are so fundamentally flawed that it is unlikely to further effective realisation of right to health even with substantial fiscal commitment. Indeed, a model of public healthcare that seeks to privilege insurance for secondary and tertiary care over expansion of public health infrastructure cannot meet the standard of human right to health.

Firstly, NHPS appears to be no different than the RSBY and the other assorted existing cashless public health insurance schemes in its focus on coverage for hospitalisation expenses. As such, these schemes fail to cover even half of the out-of-pocket [OOP] expenditure incurred on healthcare. In fact, a recent study on the effectiveness of the RSBY concluded that 60% of OOP expenditure on healthcare relates to outpatient costs.[10] Insurance coverage that is limited to hospitalisation related expenses therefore, can only have a marginal impact on making healthcare more affordable. Indeed, a Brookings study found that Indian “public health insurance programmes have been ineffective in lowering health expenditures of Indian households.”[11] In view of the fact that health-related expenses is one of the major reasons for households to fall into poverty,[12] the failure to curtail OOP spending is a singular weakness of the existing model of public health insurance.

It must also be noted that General Comment No. 14 of the CESCR states that “health facilities, goods and services must be within safe physical reach for all sections of the population”. Yet, the National Family Health Survey-II (NFHS-II) found that only 13 % of the rural population in India have access to primary health centres and only 9.6% have access to hospitals in rural areas.[13] Another study found that 32 % of the respondents in rural areas had to walk for more than 5 kilometres to seek even OPD treatments.[14] Introduction of an insurance-based model of public healthcare, which is predicated on reimbursement for treatment undertaken in private hospitals, is ill-suited for India. Given that most of the empanelled hospitals are likely to be situated in urban areas, availability of insurance coverage is unlikely to result in meaningful access to healthcare without expansion of public health infrastructure. This is also borne by the insights from capabilities approach as propounded by Professor Amartya Sen, which tell us that mere availability of resources does not on its own result in substantive enjoyment of a basic functioning like healthcare since the conversion of resources into a functioning is variable and deeply contingent on personal heterogeneities and diversities in physical and social environment.[15]

Insurance-driven schemes for public health like NHPS are also likely to undermine the quality of healthcare through the distortions they induce in healthcare.  As Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze wrote in ‘An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions,’ an insurance system focussed on hospitalisation may lead to excessive and unnecessary hospitalisation, especially for diseases, such as diabetes, circulatory problems and cancer, that can be best dealt with by early – pre-hospitalization – treatment.[16] Indeed, there are documented accounts of patients being subjected to unnecessary medical procedures by hospitals under the RSBY scheme.[17]The scope for such unethical practices are particularly aggravated due to the systematic information asymmetry between patients and medical professionals that is pervasive in healthcare sector.

Furthermore, the tilt towards secondary and tertiary healthcare created by such schemes can have a very deleterious impact on health outcomes by shifting scarce public resources away from primary healthcare. The positive relationship between primary healthcare and improved health outcomes have been well-established through studies from different parts of the world.[18] In fact, stronger primary health care systems not only result in better health but also partially counteract the pact of poor economic conditions on health and decrease reliance on hospitalisation and emergency services.[19] As it is, the primary healthcare system in India is severely understaffed and underfunded with a single Primary Health Centre (PHC) being responsible, on average, for more than 30,000 people.[20] Since the announcement of NHPS has not been accompanied by a significant increase in budgetary outlay on health, the scheme is likely to accentuate the shift of resources from primary healthcare to a form of subsidy to private hospitals which the poor shall be compelled to rely on even more. In this context, it is alarming that the share of the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in total health expenditure has declined in the last two years.[21]

As such, the NHPS is ill-suited to make healthcare available, accessible and affordable and guarantee effective realisation of the human right to health, for the poor in the country. A decade of experience with RSBY and other state-level schemes like Vajpayee Arogyasree and Rajeev Arogyasreeshould have provided the government sufficient evidence of the inherent limitations of a public health insurance scheme that is limited to coverage for hospitalisation related expenditure. NHPS fails to transcend those limitations and is unlikely to have a transformative effect on enjoyment on the human right to health, even if adequate financial support is provided for the scheme.

(Saurabh Bhattacharjee is an Assistant Professor at the WB National University of Juridical Sciences)

[1]Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, National Health Policy 2017, 5 (2017), available at http://cdsco.nic.in/writereaddata/National-Health-Policy.pdf.

[2]RashtriyaSwasthyaBoma Yojana, About RSBY – The Genesis of RSBY, available at http://www.rsby.gov.in/about_rsby.aspx (last accessed on February 3, 2017)

[3]Centre for Innovation in Public Systems, Vajpayee Arogyasri, Karnataka, available at http://www.cips.org.in/documents/DownloadPDF/downloadpdf.php?id=87&category=Health(last accessed on February 3, 2017).

[4]Aarogyasri Healthcare Trust, Aarogyasri Scheme, available at http://www.aarogyasri.telangana.gov.in/web/guest/aarogyasri-scheme(last accessed on February 3, 2017).

[5]Megha Health Insurance Scheme, http://mhis.nic.in/about-us(last accessed on February 3, 2017).

[6]Aditya Kalra, India’s ‘Modicare’ to Cost about $1.7 billion a year: sources, Reuters, February 2, 2018, available at https://in.reuters.com/article/india-health/indias-modicare-to-cost-about-1-7-billion-a-year-sources-idINKBN1FM0FA; See also Prabhat Patnaik, Budget 2018: Fantabulous Schemes with Not a Paisa Earmarked, Feb.3, 2018, available at http://www.thecitizen.in/index.php/en/NewsDetail/index/2/12913/Budget-2018-Fantabulous-Schemes-With-Not-A-Paisa-Earmarked.

[7]UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html.

[8]UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html.

[9]UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d0.html.

[10]R Shahrawat and KD Rao, Insured Yet Vulnerable: Out of Pocket Payments and India’s Poor, 27 Health Policy Plan 3 (2012).

[11]Shamika Ravi, Rahul Ahluwalia and Sofi Bergkvist, Health and Morbidity in India (2004-2014), Brookings 2016, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/201612_health-and-morbidity.pdf.

[12]Anirudh Krishna, One Illness Away: How People Become Poor and How They Escape Poverty (2013).

[13] National Family Health Survey, NFHS-2 India: Main Report, 1998-1999 available at http://rchiips.org/nfhs/india2.shtml.

[14] Press Trust of India, Study reveals rural India gets only 1/3rd of hospital beds, The Hindu, July 2013, at http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/health/study-reveals-rural-india-gets-only-13rd-of-hospital-beds/article4931844.ece#!.

[15]Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 254-255 (2009).

[16]Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions(2013).

[17]Sulakshana Nandi, Is the National Health Insurance Scheme in Chattisgarh Doing More Damage than Good, November 3, 2017, available at https://thewire.in/193696/national-health-insurance-scheme-chhattisgarh-damage-good/.

[18]Barbara Starfield, Leiyu Shi and James Macinko, Contribution of Primary Care to Health Systems and Health, Milbank Q. 2005 Sep; 83(3): 457–502.

[19]Leiyu Shi, The Impact of Primary Care: A Focused Review, Scientifica, Volume 2012 (2012).

[20]N Devadasan, Of Primary Importance, Indian Express, June 11, 2014, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/of-primary-importance/

[21]Sourindra Mohan Ghosh and ImranaQadeer, Poor Diagnosis and Wrong Medicine, Indian Express, February 3, 2018.

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By Shivani Kabra and Anirudh Krishnaa

There is no doubt that patriarchy is widely prevalent in society – at home, at work, and even in educational institutions. One always looks towards the pillars of justice, guardians of constitutional values – the courts – for a reprieve from these ordeals. However, patriarchy is so pervasively entrenched in society that it is further reinforced by the judiciary which tends to propagate violence against women.

One such example would be the recent ‘Love Jihad’ case[1] brought before the Kerala High Court. In this case, a Hindu woman, Akhila befriended a Muslim woman named Jaseena. She maintained close contact with Jaseena and her family, subsequently changing her name to Hadiya while converting to Muslim faith. Consequently, Hadiya’s father filed a petition before the Kerala High Court for regaining custody of Hadiya, which was rejected on the grounds that Hadiya, being a major of sound mind, was capable of making her own decisions.[2] A second petition was filed during the pendency of which Hadiya decided to marry Shafin Jahan. The petitioner’s contentions were that a female in her twenties was at a ‘vulnerable age’ and as per ‘Indian tradition’ the custody of an unmarried daughter rested with parents till she was ‘properly married’. The courts further stated that parental authority and control does not cease when the child attains majority.

Such arguments of paternalistic authority have found support in the prior case of Dr. Lal Parameswar vs. Ullas. N.N[3] where a father illegally detained his daughter in his house since she wanted to marry a man her father did not approve of. The court opined that “parents were naturally the proper people for making decisions concerning the future and career of their children, and so they are entitled to control their children, especially if they are daughters, to protect them from the ‘vagaries of adolescence’”.[4] Through such an approach, the Court absolutely ruled out the concept of individual autonomy and agency while denigrating female intellect and maturity.

The aforementioned conclusion was replicated in Hadiya’s case, (Love Jihad case) wherein though the court admitted that questions of faith and religion were matters of personal conviction, not to be interfered with[5], they still declared the marriage a sham and remanded an adult female to the custody of her father. The reasoning postulated was deduced on the ground that she was not a bright student and therefore incapable of taking firm, independent decisions.[6]

This judgment in the ‘Love Jihad Case’ is a reflection of gender actions within the framework of benevolent sexism that regard women as dependant entities incapable of individual autonomy. The court’s ruling that remanded Hadiya into the custody of her father was due to her ‘moderate intellect’, which made her vulnerable to the evils of society. The decisive attitude with which the courts stripped Hadiya of her decisional autonomy and vested the same with her father is the literal and symbolic definition of paternalistic. Not only does this approach take away the decisional agency of an adult woman but it also reinstates its effectiveness in controlling women choices and shaping them into conformity with idealized traditional norms. Such denials of a woman’s’ self-hood is nothing but the vestiges of rescinded practices of covertures, and deliberate infantilisation of females into being considered inept at decision making.[7]

In an alternate case[8] before the courts, three students from Jindal Global Law School blackmailed and engaged in forceful sexual relations with a fellow student. Though they were initially convicted and sent to prison, the Punjab & Haryana High Court recently released the accused students on bail while reviewing the case. According to the court, the incident “was reflective of a degenerative mindset of the youth breeding denigrating relationships mired in drugs, alcohol, casual sexual escapades and a promiscuous and voyeuristic world.”[9] The court questioned the virtues and attitude of the female student prior to the act and blamed her for the entirety of the incident. On considering the amicable relationship of all the parties prior to the sexual assault, the court felt the incident lacked ‘gut wrenching violence’[10] and was accordingly deemed to be a misunderstood result of ‘casual relationships and adventurism’.[11]

In this context, it is relevant to mention the Delhi High Court decision in the recent Mahmood Farooqui case[12] where the said person was alleged to have sexually assaulted a foreign student. The court accepted the argument that due to prior friendly and sexual interaction between the two parties the accused was incapable of realizing absence of consent despite the numerous times the female student had said no.[13] The underlying assumption was that the female student’s resistance was too feeble for the accused to comprehend and thus would not constitute rape.[14] By doing so, it decried the concept of affirmative consent while interpreting the same on a subjective platform of the perpetrator’s understanding of the same or lack thereof. Significantly, the court inferred that though there was unwillingness in her own mind and heart, the female student had still communicated her consent.

The foregoing judgment of the Haryana High Court too reverberates of an overarching mindset engaged in system justification of traditional roles. The Haryana Court in their judgment released the perpetrators on bail owing to the ‘promiscuous’ personality of the victim and the bright futures’ of the perpetrators. Though a manifestation of the Brock Turner case[15], the court sought to take the philosophy one step forward by engaging in victim blaming and slut shaming – two devices still used by society to condition female behaviour into the mould of a model paragon. Similarly, the Delhi High Court based their judgment in M Farooqi on traditional sexual roles played by both the genders with the male being the dominant and the female, the submissive. While acknowledging gender equality activism in current times, they dubbed the same as confusing for the male intellect in understanding if there is consent (or its lack thereof) or simply a woman exercising her new-found equality activism.[16]

It is pertinent to understand that the underlying reasoning posited in all the foregoing judgments was remnant of a Victorian era paternalistic attitude. The blatantly paternalistic approach employed by the Courts while intended at ‘protecting’ and ‘caring’ for the female gender, is based on the presumption of male superiority, authority and intellect.[17] Thus the subterfuge accepted through these decisions perceives women as incompetent outside her tradition gender role of nurturer and reinstates the gender stereotype of men as protectors.

Besides the obvious disregard of the law, these judgments collectively reinstate structured gender stereotyping with the male as the dominant and the female as the submissive abider of the male’s dictates. By making sexual awareness (‘promiscuity’) of a woman the reason for her sexual assault, one denies her, her sexual agency and make the concept of consent optional; contingent upon the circumstances of the incident[18]. Assertive or self-confident females are considered an anomaly with the prevalent gender roles they are supposed to play, while the enormity of the male ego is made conditional on the number of sexual partners he has had. The dictionary meanings of the terms inter alia promiscuous, slut and wanton too restrict the usage of such nomenclature to the female gender while condescending sexual exploration by them.[19]

This general acceptance of double-standards in gender norms by most men and women unnecessarily valorises male masculinity and stigmatizes femininity to the extent of placing the latter on a subversive panel to the former (in line with the concept of ‘the second gender’)[20]. Remarkably though, it disillusions ‘male-gaze’ of a society that paradoxically looks down upon female sexuality (read ‘slutty behaviour’) while simultaneously desiring sexier females.[21] The echo of the Brock Turner case in the Haryana Court judgment while absolutely disregarding the enormity of the crime further sets a disturbing precedent of a court that accepts sexual assault of promiscuous females by individuals having bright academic and career future.

The irony in the entirety of these incidents is still however the interchangeability of the names of the Courts.

(Anirudh Krishnaa is an Associate Editor and Shivani Kabra is an Editor at the Journal of Indian Law and Society)

[1]Asokan K.M. vs The Superintendent Of Police, WP (Crl.) No. 297 of 2016.

[2]Asokan K.M. vs The Superintendent Of PoliceWP (Crl) No. 25 of 2016.

[3]Lal Parameswar v. Ullas N.N,(2014) 1 KLT 937.

[4]Id. at 8

[5]Supra note 1.

[6]Id. at 75.

[7]Feminist Perspectives on the Self, Stanford Encyclopaedia of philosophy, June 28, 1999, at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-self/#BM2

[8]Vikas Garg &Ors. v. State of Punjab & Haryana, Cr.M.No.23962 of 2017.

[9] Id.

[10]Id. at 10.

[11]Id. at 10.

[12]Mahmood Farooqui v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) CRL.A.944/2016.

[13]Id. at 58.

[14] Id. at 59.

[15]Joseph Marguiles, Racism, Classiam, Feminism… and Brock Turner, The Verdict available at https://verdict.justia.com/2016/09/06/racism-classism-feminism-brock-turner

[16]Id. at 85.

[17]Jacqueline Yi, The Role of Benevolent sexism in Gender Inequality, athttp://steinhardt.nyu.edu/appsych/opus/issues/2015/spring/yi

[18] This is further mirrored in the Delhi Court judgment where it was opined that “in acts of passion, actuated by libido, there are myriad circumstances which can surround consent and it may not necessarily always mean yes in case of yes or no in case of no.”

[19]Feona Atwood, Sluts and Riot Grrrls, Vol. 16(3) Journal of Gender Studies, September 19, 2007, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09589230701562921 ; See Jane Mills, Woman words a Vocabulary of Culture and Patriarchal Society, at https://philpapers.org/rec/MILWAV

[20]Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1949

[21]Linda LeMoncheck, Loose Women, Lecherous Men: A Feminist Philosophy of sex, 1997

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By Parva Kaushal Khare and Siddharth Sonkar

On October 11, 2017, in Independent Thought v. Union of India,[1] the Supreme Court held sexual intercourse with a girl below eighteen years of age to be rape, regardless of her marital status.[2] It did so by reading down the Marital Rape Exception.[3] However, the Bench refrained from making any observation towards marital rape of adult women. We find this problematic due to several reasons.

Firstly, there seems to be an absence of an admission that marital rape is violent. Whereas there is a piecemeal acknowledgement of the U.N Secretary General Report[4] which states that marriage is one of the commonly identified forms of violence, there seems to be an absence of an express characterisation of marital rape; of the violent forms that it can take and how rape within the marriage really affects the daily lives of women. At present, there seems to be a degree of normalisation of marital rape in discourse resulting in its conception as something that is not violent; as something which is impossible since it is not possible to rape one’s wife. David Finkelhor, in his article entitled ‘Marital Rape: The Misunderstood Crime’ suggests that even where marital rape exists in legislation, it does not exist in our imagination.[5] The ignorance of the nature of marital rape results in loss of imagery of just what it is. This ignorance stems from the misconception that when a husband compels his wife to engage in sex relations, she suffers relatively little psychological trauma as compared to when she is raped by a stranger. Whereas the husband is perceived as only ‘compelling his wife’ what a stranger does is regarded as rape. In reality, however, marital rape does involve brutality, terror, violence and humiliation, and in many cases enough to rival the most graphic stranger rape. This may be depicted by a few of these experiences:

…[O]ne had been raped at knifepoint by a husband who held her up against the wall and threatened to kill her…one was jumped in the dark by her husband and raped in the anus while slumped over a woodpile…one was gang raped by her husband and his friend both wielding blackjacks after they surprised her alone in a vacant apartment…one had her baby kidnapped by an estranged husband who compelled her to have sex as a condition for returning the child…one had a six centimetre gash ripped in her vagina by a husband who was trying ‘to pull her vagina out’.[6]

The women who experienced these rapes said that they were sexually available whenever their husbands wanted them. However, what drove these men to rape their wives was an ‘intense desire to punish, humiliate, degrade and retaliate against their wives using rape as the vehicle.”[7] Even though this haunting imagery may not include all forms of marital rape, the aforementioned experiences point towards the overwhelming need to humanise discourse surrounding marital rape, since the absence of the reality of the lives of married women from discussion results in normalising its occurrence. The judgement seems to reinforce this absence, highlighting how institutionally entrenched its misconception is.

Secondly, it is quite straightforward to read down the Marital Rape Exception by recognising the distinction between a married and an unmarried female child. However, it is much more complicated to contest the distinction between a married and an unmarried woman, regardless of her age. In case of the former, there is no distinction for the purposes of criminalising aggravated sexual assault under the Protection of Children against Sexual Offences Act, 2012.[8] So holding that the exception classifies unreasonably insofar as it applies to female children for the purposes of criminalising rape is not difficult for the Supreme Court. However, in case of the latter, in order to establish that the classification is unreasonable, the Court will have to admit that there is no rational nexus between this classification (between married & unmarried women) and the object sought to be achieved. The State’s object deciphered by the Supreme Court is admittedly to preserve the sanctity of the institution of marriage. Strangely, while recognizing this object as the basis for classification, the Supreme Court “begs the question as to why in this exception the age has been fixed as 15 years and not 18 years.[9] Does the Court mean that by raising the age threshold to eighteen years, the object becomes a rational one? Does it mean that the classification between married and unmarried females would become reasonable if it operates for women above the age of eighteen? If this is what the Court meant, then it seems to believe in a preconceived justification for marital rape of adult women. While the Supreme Court has ‘refrained from answering this question’, it has not refrained from making these remarks. Resultantly, the question continues to linger.

Thirdly, there is an implicit recognition of the constitutionality of marital rape of adult women. The Supreme Court admitted that the purpose of reading down a law is to make it consonant with the Constitution.[10] Thereafter, it admitted two possibilities:

If the legislature enacts a law which is violative of the fundamental rights of the citizens, is arbitrary and discriminatory, then the Court would be failing in its duty if it does not either strike down the law or read down the law in such a manner that it falls within the four corners of the Constitution.[11]

By reading down the Exception rather than striking it down entirely, there is recognition of its constitutionality in its present form, even if the Court has refrained from answering any questions pertaining to marital rape of adult women. This undermines the challenge to the constitutionality of the Exception as a whole, arguably making it more difficult to challenge the same. This is because the Supreme Court may regard the exception as ‘corrected’ and not feel the need for its further consideration. Such a possibility is relevant, since a group of petitions by inter alia the RIT Foundation and the All India Democratic Women’s Association challenging the marital rape exception in entirety are being heard by the Delhi High Court.[12]

To conclude, the limited conception of marital rape in present-day discourse, both in mainstream media and the highest courtrooms is a serious concern. Deconstructing the conception of marital rape by probing into the actual, social experiences of women who face violence on a regular basis is a prerequisite for adjudicating upon the lives of women from the top of an ivory tower.

(Parva Kaushal Khare is an Associate Editor and Siddharth Sonkar is an Editor at the Journal of Indian Law and Society)

[1]Independent Thought v. Union of India, WP(Civil) No. 382 of 2013 (Supreme Court).

[2]The Wire Staff, Sex with Minor Wife is Rape, Rules Supreme Court, The Wire October 11, 2017, available at https://thewire.in/186490/minor-wife-sex-rape-supreme-court/ (Last visited on November 06, 2017).

[3] Supra note 2, at ¶15; The section now states that marital rape of a girl child not below the age of eighteen years of age does not amount to rape.

[4] Indian Penal Code, Act 45 of 1862, INDIA CODE (1860).

[5] David Finkelhor, “Marital Rape: The Misunderstood Crime” available at http://www.secasa.com.au/assets/Documents/Marital-rape-The-misunderstood-crime.pdf (Last visited on November 06, 2017), 1.

[6]Id., at 2-3.

[7]Id., at 3-4.

[8] Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, No. 32 of 2012, INDIA CODE (2012), available at http://indiacode.nic.in/amendmentacts2012/The%20Protection%20of%20Children%20From%20Sexual%20Offences%20Act.pdf

[9]Supra note 2, at ¶76.

[10]Supra note 3.

[11]Supra note 2, at ¶59.

[12] Mallory Moench, High Court Questions Centre on Marital Rape: ‘How Do You Justify the Exception?’, The Wire July 19, 2017, available at https://thewire.in/159074/marital-rape-exception-high-court/ (Last visited on November 06, 2017).

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A New Era or A False Dawn: A Comment on the Code on Wages Bill 2017

by Saurabh Bhattacharjee

Labour reforms has been a part of the election manifesto of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for several General Elections now. Not surprisingly, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government tried to flag off the process of labour reforms soon after it assumed office in 2014. As part of this process, the Labour Ministry has sought to consolidate 38 central legislation into 4 Labour Codes – on Code of Wages, Code on Industrial Relations, Code on Social Security and Code on Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions. While preliminary drafts of most of these Codes are still undergoing pre-legislative consultation with various stakeholders, the Code on Wages Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha in August 2017.[1] It has subsequently been referred to the Standing Committee on Labour for its comments.

The Code on Wages Bill seeks to unify 4 laws currently in force – the Minimum Wages Act, 1948; the Payment of Wages Act, 1936; the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; and the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 – into a single enactment. As the Ministry of Labour and Employment has noted, such codification of 4 statutes into one Code “will remove the multiplicity of definitions and authorities leading to ease of compliance without compromising wage security and social security to the workers.”[2] As such, the introduction of the Code is a commendable step and the Ministry must be lauded for its attempt.

Towards Universality

Very critically, the Code on Wages Bill seeks to extend the application of the Minimum Wages Act (MWA) and the Payment of Wages Act (PWA). MWA, as it stands now, applies only to scheduled employment and Section 12 of the Act obliges the employer to pay minimum wages only for a scheduled employment with respect to which a notification has been issued under section 5 of the Act. As a result, and as clarified by the Supreme Court in Lingegowd Detective & Security Chamber Pvt Ltd. v. Mysore Kirloskar Ltd.,[3] there is no obligation whatsoever to pay minimum wages for non-scheduled employments. Therefore, while the Supreme Court of India had held that every citizen is entitled to minimum wages under Article 23 of the Constitution,[4] a large number of workers paradoxically remain outside the ambit of the MWA and do not have a statutory right to minimum wages.

The Code on Wages Bill dispenses away with this distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled employments and seeks to make the right to minimum wages a universal statutory right in so far as Section 5 of the Bill uses the word ‘employees’ without any qualification.  The extension of the Code on Wages Bill to all employees is a ground-breaking step and can truly translate the observation of the Supreme Court of India that every citizen is entitled to minimum wages under Article 23 of the Constitution of India into a reality.

Similarly, the PWA, a statute that deals with timely payment of wages and permissible deductions from wages, currently applies only to a limited set of establishments specified in section 1 (4) of the Act or notified by the Appropriate Government. Therefore, a significant number of workers do not have the protection of this statute. The Code on Wages Bill extends these provisions all establishments. There is no threshold clause provided for application of the Bill to any establishment. Thus, the artificial exclusion of establishments between notified and non-notified establishments is being sought to be eliminated. This will dramatically expand the number of workers who will have the benefit of wage protection laws and is a ground-breaking step that must be welcomed.

However, there are certain features in Code, most notably, its definition of employee and its silence on public works programme, that may belie the promise of universal application of wage protection laws.

Definition of Employee

The definition of ‘employee’ under section 2 (f) covers all persons employed on wages by an establishment to do any skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, manual, operational, supervisory, managerial, administrative, technical or clerical work except for member of the Armed Forces of the Union. This definition is relatively broad since it includes managerial and administrative functions within its scope.

Nonetheless, while the terms used like ‘manual’, ‘unskilled’, ‘skilled’, ‘technical’, ‘operational’ or ‘clerical’ are very broad, they have been subjected to comparatively narrow interpretation by the judiciary in recent cases. For example, the Supreme Court has held that school-teachers are not embraced within the fold of the MWA.[5] Similarly, creative artists and professionals have been excluded from the ambit of these terms under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. As a result, there is a danger that even though the Code seeks to universalise minimum wages by jettisoning the category of scheduled employment, a limited interpretation of definition of ‘employee’ would exclude several workers from the ambit of the Code.

It is also submitted that in so far as minimum wages has been held to be a constitutional entitlement of every worker by the Court of India,[6] imposition of a qualification on the definition of employee on the basis of nature of work defies logic. If minimum wage is indeed a matter of right for all employees, then it should be applicable to all regardless of the nature of their work. In other words, a definition similar to that provided in Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 and which covers all employees, irrespective of the kind of their work, may be more suitable of the Code on Wages has to be truly universal in its scope.

Application of Minimum Wages to Public Works Programmes

Application of MWA to public works programme has been a bone of contention, especially in the context of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Section 6 of that statute allows the Central Government to delink the wages under the NREGA Programme from minimum wages. In fact, a Committee constituted by the Central Government recently found that the NREGA wages were less than the prescribed minimum wages in fifteen states.[7] Further, the Committee rejected the need for revising the wages under the NREGA programme to match the minimum wages.[8]

This is in brazen disregard of the ruling of the Supreme Court which had held that non-payment of minimum wages amounts to forced labour.[9] Indeed, it has been held that the obligation to pay minimum wages extends to public works programme as well. In Sanjit Roy v Union of India, the Supreme Court held that minimum wages have to be paid for a drought relief programme and observed:

Every person who provides labour or service to another is entitled at the least to the minimum wage and if anything less than the minimum wage is paid to him he can complain of violation of his fundamental right under Article 23. . . The State cannot under the guise of helping these affected persons extract work of utility and value from them without paying them the minimum wage. Whenever any labour or service is taken by the State from any person, whether he be affected by drought and scarcity conditions or not, the State must pay, at the least, minimum wage to such person on pain of violation of Article 23.[10]

The applicability of minimum wages law to public works programme and particularly to NREGA in the context of Article 23 of the Constitution has been reiterated by the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Prantya Raita Sangha v. Union of India[11] and the Supreme Court in Union Of India & Ors. v. Karnataka Prantya Raita Sangha & Ors.[12]

Yet the controversy on linkage between NREGA and minimum wages has persisted. Unfortunately, the Code on Wages Bill is silent on this controversy. The Code’s failure to articulate an explicit right to minimum wages for workers under the NREGA programme undermines its stated objective of achieving universality in payment of minimum wages. A Code can scarcely be considered universal if it excludes the 10 crores workers, currently engaged by NREGA programme across the country.[13]

Fixation of National Minimum Wage: Undermining Federalism

One of the major changes that the Code will usher in is the introduction of statutory National Minimum Wage (NMW) for different geographical areas. Right from the 28th Indian Labour Conference onwards, a National Minimum Wage has been discussed and recommended in several National Labour Conference sessions – a forum for the Union Ministry of Labour and Employment and State Labour Ministers. The National Commission on Rural Labour (NCRL) had also recommended the adoption of a National Minimum Wage in 1991. As the Ministry has noted, “it will ensure that no State Government fixes the minimum wage below the National Minimum Wages for that particular area as notified by the Central Government” and thereby prevent a race-to-bottom. Therefore, this measure is not a day late and can strengthen the legal regime on minimum wages.

However, introduction of this statutory national minimum wages may raise legitimate concerns about impingement of federal autonomy since state’s prerogative to fix minimum wage rates would be substantially curtailed. It is undoubtedly a case of legitimate intrusion that is designed to only provide a baseline minimum below which states cannot fix the wage rate. Thus, the Code only minimally impairs and does not eliminate state’s freedom to fix the appropriate wage rate.

Nonetheless, it is important to take on board the concerns of state governments in fixation of National Minimum Wages. Section 9 (3) provides that the Central Government may obtain the advice of the Central Advisory Board. However, there is no positive obligation to consult state governments. This is a significant anomaly and goes against the principles of cooperative federalism that has shaped so many of India’s labour legislations. While introduction of national minimum wage is indeed commendable, providing for a statutory mechanism for consultation with state governments, or at the very least, State Advisory Boards contemplated under the Code would go a long way in assuaging concerns of state governments regarding erosion of federal autonomy.


The Code on Wages Bill is an impressive attempt to codify the four central statutes on wages and bonus into a uniform Code. While the discourse on labour reforms and codification of labour laws have largely centred around dilution of labour rights, the Code Bill stands out as an exception in so far as it breaks new ground in its attempt to remove threshold exclusions that apply to Payment of Wages Act and the Minimum Wages Act. Further, the introduction of national minimum wages may prevent a race-to-bottom between states to attract further investment. Therefore, the Code may expand the scope of wage security that workers in India currently enjoy. However, the deficiencies highlighted in this note are significant hurdles in this regard. Unless these are addressed by the Parliament, the objective of full wage security for workers may not be realised through this Code.

[This piece is based on a Comment submitted to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Labour and Employment on the Code Wages Bill 2017]        

[1] The Code on Wages Bill 2017 (Bill No. 163 of 2017) available at http://labour.nic.in/sites/default/files/Code%20on%20Wages%20Bill%202017-As%20introduced%20in%20Lok%20Sabha.pdf

[2] Ministry of Labour and Employment, The Code on Wages Bill 2017, September 5, 2017, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=170541

[3] (2006) 5 SCC 180

[4] People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 235

[5] Haryana Unrecognised Schools Association v State of Haryana (1996) 4 SCC 225

[6] Sanjit Roy v Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 525

[7] Shalini Nair, MGNREGA Wages Less than Minimum Farm Wages in 15 States: Panel, Indian Express, July 10, 2017, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/mgnrega-wages-less-than-minimum-farm-wages-in-15-states-panel-4743412/

[8] According to Central Panel, Minimum Wages in MGNREGA Will Increase Gender Inequality, The Wire, September 11, 2017, available at https://thewire.in/176106/mgnrega-minimum-wages-women/

[9] People’s Union for Democratic Rights, supra note 4.

[10] Supra note 6, 533-534.

[11] MANU/KA/1139/2011

[12] MANU/SCOR/26392/2014

[13] Ministry of Rural Development, MGNREGA at a Glance, available at http://mnregaweb4.nic.in/netnrega/all_lvl_details_dashboard_new.aspx

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Has the ‘new’ S. 498A IPC Become Cruel to Women?

by Abhijeet Singh Rawaley


In Rajesh Sharma & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., a division bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justices A. K. Goel and U. U. Lalit, was asked “whether any directions… [were] called for to prevent the misuse of Section 498A, IPC.” The provision is intended to come to the rescue and aid of women who have been treated with ‘cruelty’ by their in-laws. ‘Cruelty’ is defined as any conduct which either forces a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury to herself or harassment with a motive to extract dowry of any property or valuable security. The cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable offence carries a maximum punishment of imprisonment for 3 years.

A Union Home Ministry circular has noted that S. 498A is not being used as a “shield” of defense, but as a “weapon” for attacking their husbands and his relatives by “disgruntled” wives. In this case, Justice A. K. Goel, writing for the Court, lamented the “omnibus allegations” that emerge under the garb of S. 498A against all relatives of the husband, which according to him ought not be taken at their “face value.” A.S. Nadkarni, ASG, who was assisting the court as an amicus curiae, noted (in para 7):

“…that there is a growing tendency to abuse the said provision to rope in all the relatives including parents of advanced age, minor children, siblings, grand-parents and uncles on the strength of vague and exaggerated allegations without there being any verifiable evidence of physical or mental harm or injury. At times, this results in harassment and even arrest of innocent family members, including women and senior citizens. This may hamper any possible reconciliation and reunion of a couple.” (Emphasis supplied).

Three judgments of the Supreme Court were cited to bring home the point of judicial recognition of misuse of S. 498A (Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh). This was not the first time that directions or guidelines were passed to prevent the misuse of S. 498A. Other than the Supreme Court, the Delhi High Court has also issued directions in this respect. In 2014, the Supreme Court, in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, observed the casual manner in which the husband and his family members had been arrayed in the case, and directed that the police should not automatically arrest the husband or his relatives on the lodging of a complaint under S. 498A. Further, Magistrates should not authorize further detention in a callous or mechanical manner. Failure to adhere to these directions could provoke departmental action against both the actors.

I argue that the 2014 directions issued in Arnesh Kumar should be given some time to prove their efficacy and the judgment in Rajesh Sharma is a superficial, hasty and an overblown response to a problem that has been addressed already. The latest ruling creates a ‘new’ S. 498A altogether by introducing a formerly envisaged procedural impediment to accessing the substantive penal law remedy.

Issuance of Directions and Structural Re-design

The directions issued by the Courts can be classified into two types. One set of prima facie directions endeavor to recast the institutional design and structural constitution for investigating complaints alleging offence under S. 498A. Among other things, the Court has proposed to set up at least one Family Welfare Committee (“FWCs”) in every district under the supervisory control of the District Legal Services Authority (“DSLAs”). Preferably, the FWCs ought to be composed of three members out of able and willing “para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other citizens,” and if selected, they may be imparted additional training and paid an honorarium. All complaints under S. 498A received either by police or by magistrates must be referred to an FWC which will further confer and interact with the parties and after forming an opinion as to the facts revert to either police or the magistrate (depending on who referred the complaint to them). This has to be carried out within 30 days from the date of receipt of the complaint. As an unbinding principle, no arrests should to be effected before the receipt of this report from the concerned FWC.

The other set of directions relate to improvisation and sensitization of the existing mechanism. The Court asked for the designation of specific police officers to deal with investigations relating to commission of offences under S. 498A. Such officers may also be trained for this purpose. It was also advised that the complaints dealing with only a matrimonial discord may be compromised. Bail should be the norm, the application for which ought to be decided in one day. The district judge may also have the power to order consolidation of multiple proceedings provided that all of them relate to one matrimonial relationship. Personal appearances of family members may be dispensed with and video-conference may be adopted in appropriate cases. Lastly, the Court clarified that these directions shall not apply where the facts entail “tangible physical injuries or death.”

I attempt to primarily problematize the first set of directions as they plummet the “normative” independence of law and legal proceedings. I am in favour of only “cognitive” influences from the social world acting on the law. A normative overbearing of law with social constructions is bound to work against the interests of socially vulnerable groups such as women.

Social Facts or Perceptions Turning into Judicial Recognitions

At several points, the judgment laments the misuse of S. 498A and employs a language alien to routine adjudication. It is trite that judges speak through their judgments, and thus, we must be cognizant of what the do with what they say. The following observations by the bench are so casual that they can easily be passed off as any layman’s comment:

“This Court had earlier noticed the fact that most of such complaints are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues. Many of such complaints are not bona fide. At the time of filing of the complaint, implications and consequences are not visualized. At times such complaints lead to uncalled for harassment not only to the accused but also to the complainant. Uncalled for arrest may ruin the chances of settlement.” (Emphasis supplied)

The patriarchy resounds itself through judicial dictum to the point where the Court, through these directions, seems to overrule and override genuine instances and complaints of cruelty under S. 498A by alluding to “violation of human rights of innocent” men. In this regard, the Court seems to have lost sense of its role as a mediator and balancer of interests in aid of justice. By placing an additional step in the whole process of prosecuting under S. 498A, the Court has, in some measure, incremented the burdensome process of invoking a criminal law remedy.

The way in which the matter has been dealt with inter alia seems to have institutionalised a perceptive presumption against women in a sense that complaints will be frivolous, trivial or vexatious unless the FWC comes to the rescue of a woman and opines otherwise. The Court also appears to have lost sight of the traumatized woman who files a genuine complaint and is left to fall apart and face not the legal and judicial officers, but the FWC which attempts to mirror social forces that may be evil or benign, but not purely legal.

Making the Law Normatively Open

A prominent contribution to sociological jurisprudence is by Niklas Luhmann according to whom while the system of law must remain ‘normatively closed,’ it ought to be open only ‘cognitively.’ It is argued that law must learn from other disciplines and knowledge systems to the extent of their worth. However, it must develop its own norms and rules and thus be in the state of “transversality” as a mode of knowledge transfers as explained further by Gunther Teubner.

The structural redesign proposed by the Supreme Court blemishes the already weak law enforcement with an additional procedural grade which the women will have to traverse in order to put the wheels of justice into motion. The Court’s call to “civil society” enjoins legal processes with social influences. Excessive social influence(s) and civil society involvement may trump the very purpose of having judiciary as an independent arbiter on complex legal questions manifesting human predicaments such as cruelty to women. The FWCs will come with their own baggage of biases, dispositions, and predilections, and it might so happen that they may mirror as constitutionally constituted modern-day “khap panchayats.

Placing an additional layer in an already insurmountable challenge to step the ladder up to Courts comes as a disappointment to most women. To some extent, the directions laid down in 2014 could have been seen as making the law “cognitively open” since they did not tamper with the judicial rubric. FWCs may open floodgates for delay and could possibly stifle the administration of justice. They may also influence the process qualitatively if their opinions venture into evidentiary processes of the court. Despite a clear direction that the police or magistrate will consider the FWC report on its own merit, the evidentiary status of this report is unclear.

The judgment relies on statistics and figures of the National Crime Records Bureau from 2012 when the directions in Arnesh Kumar had not even witnessed the light of the day. The other evidence adduced (243rd Law Commission Report and the 140th Report of the Rajya Sabha Committee on Petition) possess this deficiency as well. In these circumstances, it can be said that the Court seems to have acted in haste and has mindlessly crafted something very superficial that has the potential to undo and alter the efficacy of investigations by the police and independent adjudication by courts. Such overblown activist tendencies must be avoided especially in a scenario already covered by both legislation, and previous judicial directions. 

The Way Forward

The better part about this judgment is that the Court is not setting the directives in stone and is flexible in its approach vis-à-vis the setting up of FWCs. Setting the deadline at March 31, 2018, the NALSA has been asked to report on the functioning of the proposed system, and suggest changes if necessary, pursuant to which the matter shall be listed before the Court again. Thus, the in-built review mechanism to be carried out by the Court and NALSA kindles the hope that while the old structural design will revive, more solemn efforts shall go into making courts cognitively open through adequate sensitization and training of personnel while maintaining the “self-normativity” of juridical processes. We can hope that the ‘cruelty’ done to women by the ‘new’ procedurally burdened S. 498A shall be undone.

[Abhijeet Singh Rawaley is a third-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) candidate and a Bar Council of India Trust Scholar (2017-18) at NALSAR, Hyderabad]

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External Aid Of Interpreting Statutes – Speech Orated By Ministers Who Present The Bill

by Saniya Mirani

The Indian judiciary resorts to two types of aids in interpreting a statute – internal and external aids to interpretation. Internal aids include the preamble, marginal notes, and headings of the relevant statute, etc., while external aids include legislative history, and surrounding social circumstances, amongst others. The external aids are only resorted to once the internal aids fail to resolve any ambiguity. One such external aid is the speech made by a minister who moves a legislation in the parliament. In my opinion, the evidentiary importance given to such speeches by the judiciary has increased from 1950 to 2015.

In the 1950s and 1960s the apex court had expressed two positions. According to one line of cases,[1] the speech made by a sole minister is unable to capture the intent of majority vote that led to the legislation being passed.[2] Instead, the speech only indicates the minister’s “subjective intent”.[3] Therefore, these cases held the minister’s speech as inadmissible evidence in interpreting a statute. Juxtaposed against this, was the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India. Justice Fazl Ali in this case, expressly relied upon the speech presented by Minister for Industry who had sponsored the bill (later a legislation) in question to understand the background of the dispute. A similar position was taken by dissenting Judge Shah in Shyamlal Mohanlal v. State of Gujarat:

“In construing the words used by the Legislature, speeches on the floor of the Legislature are inadmissible. I do not refer to the speech for the purpose of interpreting the words used by the Legislature, but to ascertain the historical setting in which the statute … came to be enacted”

Thus, by end of 1960s, there existed two views. The first view, regarded such speeches to be completely inadmissible. The second view, on the other hand, regarded these speeches inadmissible for the purpose of interpreting the statute. However, the speeches were considered relevant to decipher the historical background of the statute.

In my opinion, the second opinion was the advent of a new evidentiary threshold for speeches. This threshold, nevertheless, was harmonised with the first view by ensuring that a statute was not given a particular interpretation on the basis of a single speech orated during its formation. The speech was merely used to understand the context in which a given statute was being passed. In doing so, the court always respected the reasoning given in the first line of cases that the subjective intent of one speaker should not be imposed to cut down on the generality of the statute.[4]

From 1970s, the judicial trend has favoured the second view. In State of Mysore v. R.P. Bidap Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Court, stated that the first view is being whittled down and that there is no harm in admitting all extrinsic evidence that is logically relevant, though only when ambiguities exist in the plain meaning interpretation. Justice Iyer carried forward this view and explicitly held in B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan that one can no longer ignore the “voices from parliamentary debates” and that it is essential to listen to the “legislative authors when their artefact is being interpreted”. This view has been repeated in a number of judgments since then.[5] However, it must be noted that the Court has never used the speeches to directly interpret a statutory provision but only to decipher the context in which the statute was passed.[6]

On January 2, 2017, the Apex Court delivered a much-debated judgment of Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, which interpreted Section 123(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter, RPA). Section 123(3) defines a “corrupt electoral practice” as:

“The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language or.”

The issue before the court was whether the word “his” in the section referred to – (i) the religion of the candidate (or his agent) making the appeal, (ii) the religion of the elector, or (iii) both (i) and (ii).

Both the majority opinion[7] and dissenting Judge Chandrachud relied on the speech given by the law minister A.K. Sen when an amendment to Section 123 RPA was being passed. The majority relied on the speech to decipher the reason as to why the amendment was made.

However, upon the careful perusal of Justice Chandrachud’s opinion, it seems that he uses the law minister’s speech to interpret what the term “his” means. He states:

“The speech of the Law Minister, who moved the Bill leaves no manner of doubt that the expression ‘his’ referred to the religion of the candidate (or his caste, community, race or language) for whom votes were sought or of the candidate whose election was sought to be prejudicially affected by an appeal to refrain from voting.”

I agree that the judge later goes on to use the speech to understand the mischief that RPA seeks to resolve. However, the above-mentioned portion of the judgment, nevertheless indicates, that an interpretative activity has been undertaken by use of law minister’s speech. If that was the intention of the learned Judge, then this would further strengthen the evidentiary importance given to speeches orated by movers of respective legislations. It would mean that, from the time these speeches were held to be inadmissible, we have come to a situation wherein these speeches can be used to interpret an entire provision in case of an ambiguity.

In my opinion, such a situation would be precarious. It would amount to imposing the view of a person who sponsored the legislation on everybody else to whom the statute applies. In case of legislations passed long ago, it would result in the imposition of a view that may not hold relevance in present times. Therefore, the speeches orated by ministers should be used minimally and carefully so as to ensure that the generality of the statute is not hindered by opinions of a few.

(Saniya Mirani is an Associate Editor at the Journal of Indian Law and Society)

[1] Held in cases such as A.K. Gopalan v. the State of Madras 1950 AIR 27, State of Travancore v. Bombay Company Limited AIR 1952 SC 366, Aswini Kumar Ghosh and Anr. v. Arabinda Bose and Anr. 1952 AIR 369, and State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1964) 1 SCR 371.

[2] Aswini Kumar Ghosh Case, Supra note 1.

[3] Ibid.

[4] This shift has been recognised by Justice Bhagwati in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, ¶266 MANU/SC/0080/1981. “The learned Judge clearly held that while a speech on the floor of a legislature was inadmissible in ascertaining the real meaning of the word used by the legislature, the historical setting in which the statute was passed could doubtless be admissible. This decision, therefore, make a clear departure, on the point of admissibility of historical setting, from the minority dissenting judgment of Das J. as indicated above.”

[5]Sole Trustee, LokaShikshana Trust v. Commr. of Income-tax, Mysore, MANU/SC/0273/1975; K.P. Vergese v. Income Tax Officer Ernakulam, AIR 1981 SC 1922; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, 1995 AIR 1012; A. Manjula Bhashini and Ors. v. Respondent : The Managing Director, A.P. Women’s Cooperative Finance Corporation Ltd. and Anr., 2009 8 SCC 431.

[6] Ibid; See also, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1.

[7] The one delivered by Judges Madan B. Lokur; Justice Nageswara Rao.

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